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This thasis presenrs a Nuclear Targeting and Effects
program that is interded for inclusion in the Simulaticn of
Tactical Alternative Responses (STAR) comba- model. It is
presented as a stand alone program, written in SIMSCRIFT,
which can be easily modified as a subroutine for any high
resolution combat model requiring tactical nuclear effects
simulaticn. When presented with a group of targets which
are deemed suitable for attack by tactical nuclear weapons,
the program will select units to fire, select proper yields
for multiple yield weapon systems and assess casualties
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This thesis presents a nuclear targeting and effects
program that is intended for inclusion in the Simulation of
Tactical Alternative Responses (STAR) combat model. It is
presented as a stand alone program, written in SIMSCRIFT,
which can be easily modified as a subroutine for any high
resolution combat model reguiring tactical nuclear effects
simulaticn.
When presented with a group of targets which are deemed
suitable fcr attack by tactical nuclear weapons, the program
will select units to fire, select proper yields for multiple
yield weapon systems and assess casualties among Armor and
Infantry within the target area.
A. CAPABILITIES
The model in this thesis analyzes the given targets for
destruction by nuclear weapons. In so doing it;
1. Can handle any number of targets.
2. Can handle any number of nuclear capable firing
batteries each of which may have any number of
different yield rounds available.
3. Can keep trade of any number of friendly maneuver
units.
4. Provides for friendly troop safety.
5. Represents targets as composed only of personnel and
tanks.
6- Assesses dainage to each individual target element in a
stochastic manner rather than as an expected value.




Scms of the items listed as iiai^arions are such only
because net all weapons are included in the data base or nor
all possible target elements are included in -che targets.
Most cf the following can be input into the model with a
moderate amount cf work. The model does not;
1. Use free flight rockets, missiles or Air Force
delivered muniticns.
2. Use strategic weapons.
3. Consider collateral damage avoidance.
4. Model any other effects such as NBC warning and
reporting, optimum time of exit for units caught in
fallout areas, crossing fallout areas, decontamination
or medical evacuation and treatment of casualties.
C. THISIS FBEVIEW
Chapter II will briefly review the effects of nuclear
weapons. The damage mechanisms will be introduced while
formulas and methodology for building the assessment phase
of the model will be developed.
Chapter III will discuss some of the more relevent
definitions the reader must become familiar with and then
will show how the analyst in the field solves the target
analysis problem. The model will mimic this manaal solution
in order to arrive at the same solution a field anaylst
would get.
Chapter lY will discuss the mechanics of how the model
works without being code specific. Some simplifying
assumptions will be made and approximations will be offered
to reduce the processing time.
12

chapter V will explain the code of the model. Each
routine and function will be discussed separately. All
global variables, permanent and temporary entities "along
with their attributes, set membership and ownership are
explained and must be fully understood to comprehend the
model.
Chapter 71 will identify possible areas for further
research. Areas include a method for optimum assignment of
fcatteries/yields to targets, standard field operations taken
during and after a nuclear burs- and inclusion cf ether
elements into the target area.
13

II. E FFEC TS OF NOCLEAR HEAPONS
A. IMTBODOCTION
A nuclear explosion, like any conventional explosion,
results from the very rapid release of a large amount of
energy in a small space - an energy density. In simple
mechanics, the liberation of energy is manifested as
pressure, heat and, in the case of nuclear weapons, ionizing
radiation. The damage mechanisms of nuclear weapons are
refered to as blast, thermal radiation and nuclear
radiation. Damage caused by blast, is further divided into
damage caused by overpressure and by dynamic pressure.
The heat of the weapon is almost instantly transmitted
through thermal radiation to every object within
line-of-sight constraints. Objects at distances of several
miles will begin to absorb enough heat to cause combustable
materials tc burst into flame. The pressure of the weapon
is transmitted through a blast wave -rfhich emanates
spherically from the point of detonation and travels at
speeds closely related to the speed of sound. Upon
encountering a target element the blast wave may crush the
target because of a high overpressure, or it may destroy it
by translation - the act of tumbling it about on the ground.
Finally, the nuclear weapon has associated with it the
harmful, highly penetrating nuclear radiation. The
explosion emits alpha and beta particles, neutrons and gamma
rays. Due tc their charge, alpha and beta particles have no




Neutrons are one of ths basic building blocks of th«
atomic nucleus and have no electronic charge. It is the
lack of charge which allows deep propagation" and
penetration.
Gamma rays are electromagnetic radiation. They are
identical in composition to light, radio waves, and X-rays
except for wavs length and are not easily stopped or
absorbed.
Beth neutron and gamma radiation are refered tc as
ionizing radiation. The biological implication of this is
that as the radiation passes through living tissue i-
ionizes seme of it, changing the chemical structure into a
different, ncn-f unct ienal substance. Essentially, it kills
cells or inhibits them from functioning as intended.
B. ENERGI EISTRIBDTICN
The percentages of total energy appearing as blast,
thermal radiation, and nuclear radiation depend mostly on
the altitude at which the blast occurs. For bursts within
the lower atmosphere the percentages are about 50, 35, and
15 percent respectively. Thus, as with conventional
weapons, blast is th€ dominant factor.
C. BLAST
Targets are damaged by a crushing mechanism caused by




Overpressure is the crushing force applied to a
target. When an object begins to interact with the blast
wave, the leading edge of the object is subjected to an
increase in pressure while the trailing edge is still at
15

ambient pressure. This produces a quick net force away from
the tlast. As the blast wave envelopes the objecn the
entire exterior is subjected to an increased pressure . while
the interior remains at ambient pressure. Thus, a crushing
force is applied to the exterior in an attempt to damage it.
Lungs and eardrums are easily damaged by this mechanism at
overpressures of 6 psi.
2- Cvnamic Pressure
As the name implies, this is the pressure which is
associated with high winds. Dynamic pressure can damage
targets by pushing, tumbling and tearing them apart.
Targets damaged primarily by dynamic pressure are called
drag sensitive. With the exception of heavily armored
vehicles such as tanks, most military materiel is drag
sensitive. Personnel in the open are drag sensitive and are
damaged easily by flying debris.
3 • ^1§1 iilZS C haract e ristics
Upon detonation, a blast wave of compressed air
moves spherically away from the poinr of detonation. The
wave speed is well in excess of the speed of sound. As the
wave propagates, the speed diminishes un~il it exhausts
itself. The quantification of three blast wave
characteristics is essential to simulating blast casualties.
The characteristics are overpressure and dynamic pressure as
well as the time of arrival of the blast wave.
a. Overpressure
Fig. 2.1 [Ref, 1: p. 113] is a graph relating
distance from ground zero to height of burst with
overpressure as a parameter. The figure is for a 1 KT
weapon but can be used for any weapon with the proper
scaling laws applied. Equation 2.1 is the cube root scaling
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An example will demoDstrate how the method works.
Given: an 8 KT weapon is detonated at a height of 200 ft.
Find: The peak overpressure at 1200 ft. from ground zero.
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From Fig. 2.1, at a distance of 600 ft. with a height of
turst of 100 ft. the peak overpressure is 30 psi.
Ref. 1 has two other overpressure graphs. One
is for overpressures of 10,000 to 100 psi and the ether is
for over pressures of 15 to 1 psi.
These problems may be worked in reverse to solve
for the optimum height of burst if one knows the required
overpressure to defeat a target. This concept will be quite
important in chapters III and IV. An example will
demonstrate the methcd.
Given: An 8 KT weapon will be used against a target which
is defeated by 10 psi overpressure.
Find: Optimum height of burst.
Solution: The optimum solution is the one which produces
the required effect at the farthest distance from the burst.
From Fig. 2.1 the distance is 1U60 ft. and the height of
burst is 740 ft. From equation 2.1 the actual height of
burst and actual distance where the effect will be felt can
be found.
d = d, -W^^"^ = 1460*3-^^^ = 2920 ft. = 890 meters
h = h 'W-^^^ = 740 •8-^'^^ = 1480 ft. = 451 meters
In this Banner, the optimum height of burst for
this damage mechanism may be found for any target when the
required overpressure and expected yield are known. This





Fig. 2.2 [Ref. 1: p. 117] is a graph relating
distance frcm ground zero to height of burs- with dynamic
pressure as a parameter. Like Fig. 2.1, it is for a 1 KT
400 500 600 700 800 900 i,CCO 1,100 1,200 i.iOO 1,400
DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (FEET)
Figure 2.2 Scaled Values of Dynamic Pressure,
detonation, bur the same cute root scaling equation applies.
Another example will demonstrate the method-
Given: a 27 KT weapcn is detonated at a height of 600 ft.
Find: The dynamic pressure at 2400 ft. from ground zero.
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Solution: The corresponding heighr cf burst for a 1KT hurst
is;
^ - ^ _600 _^nn^-+
^1 "
~l/3 1/3 " ^°° ^^•W 2 7
and the ground disxance is
, . d _ 2400 _ Q_^ r:.d - - / / - 800 ft.
W 27
From Fig. 2.2, at a distance of 800 ft. with a height of
burst of 200 fr. tha dynamic pressure is 8 psi.
In a manner analogous to xhat offered in the
section above, an optimum height of burst may be found for
targets damaged by dynamic pressure.
c. Time of Arrival
Fig. 2.3 [Ref. 1: p. 121] is a graph relating
distance frcm ground zero to height of burst with the time
cf arrival of the blast wave as a parameter. Like Figs. 2.1
and 2.2, it is for a 1 KT detonation, but the same cube root
scaling equation applies. Again, an example will
demonstrate the method.
Given: a 64 KT weapon is detonated at a height of 2000 ft.
Find: The time of arrival of the blast wave at a distance
of 3 miles from ground zero.
Solution: From previous techniques;
h = 500 ft. d = 3960 ft.
From Fig. 2.3 the time for a 1 KT burst is 2.8 sec. and
1/3 1/3
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Figure 2.3 Scaled Values of 1 KT Blast Have Arrival Time,
I* is interesting tc note that as the yield increases, the
time of arrival increases which means the speed of ths blast
wave is decreasing.
D. THERMAL RADIATION
Thermal radiation is a radiant heat transfer mechanism
which propagates with the speed of light. Upon burst every
object with line-of-sight tc the burst begins to absorb heat
at a rate predicted by the thermodynamic laws governing
thermal radiation. Ccmbustable materials will ignite if the
rate and exposure time are sufficiently high. Personnel
will suffer first, second, and even third degree burns if
reaction times are slew and absorption rate is high. Fig.
2.4 [Bef. 1: p. 291] shows the relationship between yield,










Equaxion 2.2 is tha linear regrsssion for Fig. 2.4.
Nuclear bursts emit two distinc- pulses of therical
radiation. The second one conta:ins about 99 percent of the
destructive power. It consists of visible and infrarad




Any condition which affects the visibility or
transparancy of the air will modify zhe transmission of
thermal radiation. Clouds, smoke, fog, rain and snow will
absorb and scatter the energy. Also, a cloud cover above
the burst can reflect energy back to the target and increase
the therial radiaticn that would have otherwise traveled
harmessly into the sky. Obviously, any solid object which
will not become a victim of thermal radiation will provide
adequate protection- Such objects include, hills, foxholes,
bunkers, vehicles, trees and other people.
As stated earlier, the exposure time would be a facxor
in determining total exposure. However, in actual tests it
was discovered that ccmbustable materials such as wood frame
houses charred almost instantaneously. Also, due -co the
short duration of the thermal pulse, a steady state thermal
heat transfer condition was not achieved and the buildings
were able to absorb and dissapate the initial burst of
energy and avoid ignition.
The pcint of the preceeding paragraph is that reaction
time of a potential absorber, such as a soldier on the
battlefield, will play an insignificant part in determining
thermal radiation effects.
Fig. 2.5 [Ref. 1: p. 314] shows the futility of avoiding
burns if one is sufficiently close to ground zero. The
following quote [Ref, 1: p. 313] sums it up;
At the lower energy yields the thermal radiation is
eraitt<=d in such a snort time that no evasive action is
possible. At the higher yields, however, exposure to
much of the thermae radiation could be avoided if
evasive action were taken within a fraction of a second
of the explosion time. It must be remembered, of
course, that even during this short period a very
considerable amount of thermal energy will have been
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Figar€ 2-5 Energy Emmission as a Funcxion of Time.
S. NQCLEiSB RADIATION
''
• Ngu tro n Ra diation
Dpon detonation of a nuclear w9apon a large quantity
of fr€e neutrons is released. The neutron release prccass
is ccmpleted in less than a million-h of a second [Ref. 1:
p. 340]. This is where the term prompt radiation comes
from. However, due to collisions in the early stages of the
detonation, actual escape may be delayed for a thousandth of
a seccad - an insignificant comfort to potential targets.
Since the neutron has no charge it does not have a
direct ionizing effect. The biologically harmful ionization
occurs when the neutron collides with hydrogen in body
2U

tissue. The neutron transfers its energy to the nucleus and
frees it frcm the accompanying electron. Thus a frsa
protron and a beta particle ara allowed to cause iot^izing
tissue damage. Previously, beta had been disregarded as a
source of concern. This was due to the impossibility of
getting the particle in-o the body. in the context of the
current discussion, it is already inside the body.
Fig. 2.6 [Ref. 1: p. 346] is a graph relating yield


















Figure 2.6 Heutron Hadiation.
body tissue as a parameter. For a given yield and slant
range, the absorbed radiation can be predicted. Equation






2 . Gamma 5a dia ticn
Dpon detonaticn of a nuclear weapon, gamma radiation
is emitted. There are several mechanisms which cause gamma
radiaticn at various times during and after the detonation.
Eef. 1 (Sect 8.06 - 8.19) contains a detailed explanation of
the mechanisms. Rather than delve into the sources of gamma
radiaticn it is more important to predict absorption rates






















Figure 2.7 Gamma Radiation.
Fig. 2.7 [Ref. 1: p. 333] is similar to Fig. 2.6.
For a given yield and slant range, the absorbed dose due to
gamma radiation can be predicted. Equation 2.U is the










Since gamma radiation is just lighr in a certain
range of the electromagnetic spectrum, it behaves in
accordance with the same laws, such as absorption. However,
commcn cpaque objects such as steel, concrete, paper, etc.
which reflect or totally absorb visible lighr, only absorb a
portion of the gamma radiation. A common example of this is
traveling into a tunnel with the radio on in the car. The
reception weakens as the amounT: of shielding increases.











The Tenth Value Thickness is that thickness of the
specified material which will cut the radiation by a factor
of 10. Thus, 3,3 inches of steel or 16 inches of earth will
reduce a 500 rad. dose to 50 rads. The addition cf another







D is the predicted absorbed dose
Eq is the unprotected dose
T is the thickness of protective material
Ti is the tenth value thickness.
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III. NOCLSAB TiRGET ANAtlSIS
a. DEFINITIONS
Before beginning to make a weapon selection it is
necessary to understand the terms peculiar to the subject.
Some of the more important ones are presented here while the
more cbvicus ones are found in the glossary.
1 . Ead ius of Tar get (RT )
This is the actual radius of the target, or an
equivalent radius if the target is equatable to a circle.
Ref 2 contains a nomograph to determine the appropriate RT
for targets equatable to a circle. :iore importantly, the
target elements within the target are assumed to be
uniformly distributed.
2- Radius of Dairaqe (RD)
This is the distance from ground zero at which a
single target element has a 50% chance of receiving the
specified degree of damage. The RD is a function cf weapon
yield, height of burst, casualty criterion and, in the case
of personnel, the protection level. Fig. 3.1 shows a circle
drawn with a radius from ground zero such that as many
damaged elements (dark dots) are outside the circle as there
are undamaged (light dots) inside the circle. Thus, an
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Figure 3. 1 Radius of Damage-
^ • iSiS^JSliS Ra d i s of D ama c[e ( ttlN RD)
If ths firing of a large nuaber of rounds against a
target was siaula-ced, a probability distribution for the RD
would begin to emerge. Fig. 3. 2 is a curaulative
distribution function for a hypothetical RD distribution.





Figure 3. 2 CDF of RD.
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^ • C ir cula r E r rcr Probable (CEP)
If a large number of rounds obeying a circular
normal distribution were fired at ground zero and the inpact
points plotted, then CEP would be defined as that distance
from ground zero that is exceeded as often as not. Fig. 3.3
shows an idealized plot of such firings. A circle of 1 CE?
includes 50^ of the rounds.
4 CEP
99 99**
Figure 3.3 Circular Hormal Distribution of Impact.
The distribution of impacts is assumed to have a
bi-7ariat€ normal distribution about the aim point with
3qual variances and a zero correlation coefficient. Thus, a
relationship between CEP and variance can be determined and
is;
CEP = 1.1774'a (3.1)
31

5. Circular Distribution 90(CD9 0)
CD90 is very much like CEP except that 90%
rounds are expected to fall within 1 CD90 of ground zero.
When a priority target is being considered it is CD90 which
is ussd as the dispersion parameter. The relationship
between CC90 and CSP is
CD90 = 1.83-CEP (3.2)
6. Pec table Error Height-of-burst (PEH)
Similar to CZF, but in one dimension, the PEH is
that distance above and below the desired height of burst in
which 50/? of the rounds are expected to function. Vertical
delivery is assumed to be normally distributed about the
desired height of burst. Therefore, the relationship
between PEH and standard deviation is easily calculated as;
a = ^ (3.3)
Mcsr fuzing mechanisms are highly reliable and accurate.
This ensures optimum height of burst and maximum casualties.
It also allows some simplifying assumptions in Chapter IV.
7. Gcverninq Sfjjct
Most targets are affected by more than one damage
mechanism. In order to simplify the analysis the range at
which a target is damaged is tabulated and the effect
corresponding to the largest range is selected as the
governing effect. Table II lists hypothetical ranges for


















For exposed personnel, it would appear that zherioal
radiaticn is the governing effecx. However, due tc the
unpr edict ibility of target posture, -chermal radiaticn is
never used as the governing effect [Ref. 3: P. 23]. Also,
it is almcst universally true that the effects of
overpressure are felt at a greater range than the effects of
dynamic pressure. This leaves only two criteria to compete
for gcverning effect - blast dus to overpressure and nuclear
radiation. In table II, the governing effect for exposed
personnel is nuclear radiation and for personnel in foxholes
it is overpressure.
8- Desired Height of 3urst(DHgB)
The DHOB is the aaximum of two possible HOB.
It is usually desirable to obtain a lew air burst
without causing fallout. Eg. 3.4 is th9 formula for
calculating the height of burst fallout safe (HOBfs) for
yields less than 100 KT and Eg. 3.5 is the formula for
calculating the HOBfs for yields greater than 100 KT.
33

HOBfs = 30-W1/3 (3. a)
HOBfs = 55»W1/3 (3.5)
W is the expected yield plus 10%.
Ctviously this will produce fallout in 50^ cf the
rounds. Therefore, a safety buffer of 3.5 PEH is added to
HOBfs. This quantity is now refered to as HOB99 - the HOB
at which there is a 99% chance cf no fallout.
Depending upon the type cf target and ccmmand
guidance, there is a HOB which will cause optiaum damage
(HOBopt) . This was seen earlier in the discussion on
overpressure and dynamic pressure and -che governing effect
section above. The desired HOB (DHOB) is the maximum of
HOB99 and HCBopt. In most cases, HOBopt is greater than
HOB99 and is, therefore, the listed HOB. It is only when
FEH becomes large that HOB99 is greater than HOBopt: and the
DHOB must be raised above HOBopt, thus reducing expected
coverage.
5- 5i2i3£i Z ero (G2)
The point on the ground directly below the position
where the round actually detonates.
''0. Cesired Ground Zero (DGZ)
The actual aim point. The DGZ might not be the
center of the target as will be seen later. GZ is only a






To cause maximum damage, -he round must be targeted
at the cenrer of the target. For various reasons, it may be
necessary tc deliberately shoot at a location other than the
target center. If RT and RD are of -he same order of






A) Less of ccverag' B) No loss of coverage
Figure 3.4 loss of Coverage Due to Offset,
The analyst: uses coverage -cables from reference 2 in
making the analysis. Fig. 3.5 is a sample of cne such
table. Each weapon system and yield has a complete set of
tables. A set includes;
1. Immediate permanent, immediate transient and latsnt
lethalities to exposed personnel, personnel in open fox
holes and personnel in tanks (9 tables)
2. Moderate damage to tanks, wheelad vehicles and towad
artillery (3 tables)
For each range and RT combination, there are two
coverage figures listed. The first is a high assurance
figure to be used when planning an attack on a priority
target. There is a 90% chance of obtaining the listed
coverage of the specified damage when using this figure.
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The s€ccnd figure is an expected coverage. There is a SO'^o
chance cf cbtaining the listed coverage of the specified
damage when using this figure.
2« Chocsinq the Correct Round
It quickly becomes obvious that there will be mere
than cne weapon system which is adequate. The question is,
"Which cne is best?" The answer depends upon current
guidance from the chain-of -ccmmand. Several policies are
possible;
A. Select maximum yield.
B. Select maximum coverage.
C. Select minimum yield of the adequate possibilities.
D. Select minimum coverage of the adequate possibilities.
This model uses maximum coverage. In order to
provide for friendly toop safety, it will be seen that
maximum yield may not provide maximum coverage.
C. MZTHCDS OF ANALYSIS
Current doctrine allows several methods of nuclear
target analysis ranging from visual to preclusion oriented.
Only two methods use detailed mathematical analysis. They
are called the index method and the numerical method.
The index method requires that the desired ground zero
be the center of the target. The numerical method allows
the desired ground zero to be deliberately offset from the
target center.
^ ' Index Method
The index methcd is the easiest and quickest method.
To use this method the analyst needs only the appropriate
table (s) , the range from the applicable weapon delivery
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sysrem and the target radius. The appropriate table is
determined by target type, desired effects, weapon type and
weapon yield. Fig. 3-5 is a typical table for personnel
in the open, latent Isthatities, short range cannon, 1 KT
yield
.
COVERAGE TABLE SHORT RANGE CANNON
(Distances in meters) 1KT
E X P S E D P E R S N N E L - L A T E N T L E T H A L 1 T Y
LOW A 1 R 8 U R S T
EFFECTIVENESS PROB ACCURACY DATA
RADIUS Of TARGET MIN EXPT
RANGC 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1 300 1 500 RO RD CO 90 CEP HOB PEH
2000 it/.n .»3/.9« .85/. 88 .51/5 S .41/. 43 .29/ 3.t .21/. 22 .09/. 12 460 526 80 38 49
3000 96m .91/.M .85/. 97 .5:/.5(. .41/. 43 .30/3:I .20/. 22 .10/. 12 4 58 532 03 44 59
1.000 ii/.n .11/. 95 .85/. 87 .53/.5«> .41/. 43 .30/.3'! .20/. 22 .10/. 12 454 532 ?9 47 59
iOOO .«/ »• .91/. 95 84/87 .53/.
5
7 .41/. 43 .30/.3Jt .20/. 22 .10/. 12 447 538 111 54 69
tooo .?»/»• .91/. 95 .81/86 .53/.5"r .41/. 43 .30/.3it .20/. 22 .10/. 12 44» 540 128 62 82
'000 .J5/.97 .91/.9* .80/. 85 .55/.5-7 .41/. 43 .30/. 3 1 .20/. 22 .10/. 12 442 540 141 73 90
8000 .*/.»« .•«/.92 .75/. 83 .5*/. ' .41/. 43 .30/3-! .20/. 22 .10/. 12 434 538 176 86 lOl
woo .«/.M .78/.S8 .68/. 78 .53/.5<) .37/. 41 .28/3-t .20/. 22 08/. 11 420 520 205 100 116
lOOOO S« / 9* .71/. 85 .61/. 75 .50/. S .36/40 .26/3 I .18/. 21 .06/. 11 400 490 234 115 132 30
Figure 3.5 Exposed Personnel, Latent Lethalities, SRC, 1 KT
Entry arguments ar
nexz highesx listed value)
radius is less than the fir
listed coverage is taken as
target radius is larger tha
weapon system is ccnsidar
interpolation is performed
coverage is reported as the
EXAKFLE. If a short
against personnel in the o
meters and the range to
expected coverage would be
e the range (rounded up to the
and target radius. If the target
St listed radius, then the first
the expected coverage. If the
n the last listed radius then the
ed unsatisfactory. Otherwise,
on the radius and the resulting
expected initial coverage.
range cannon weapon was employed
pen with a target radius of 690




2 . Numeric al Method
Wh€r it is cecessary to deliberately shoot -at a
target with an aim point other than the rarget center, the
numerical method must be used. Fig. 3.6 was the chart
designed for usage with expected coverage, but has been
ruled invalid by OSANCA. (Fig. 3.6 may still be used for
expected coverage with no offset.) Therefore, when
employing an offset aimpoiat it is necessary to use the high
assurance chart as shown in Fig. 3.7 which is used in the
following discussion.
The numerical method has the following 6 steps.
1. Calculate RD divided by HT and locate on the lefr axis.
2. Calculate CD90 divided by RT and locate on the bottom
axis.
3. The intersection of the values prediccs the coverage
wixhcut offset.
4. Calculate d divided by CD90 and locate on the left
axis.
5. Measure the distance from the point located in U above
to the line labeled "displaced DGZ d/CD90". This is
refered to as the "measured distance".
6. Apply the "treasured distance" to the right of the point
found in 3 above. This final point predicts the
coverage due tc offset. It must also be remembered
that this coverage has a 90% chance of occurring since
the solution was found by using the high assurance
table.
The following example is depicted in Fig. 3.7.
GIVEN:
RD = 600 meters CD90 = 100 meters
FT = 800 meters d = 300 meters
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Find: The fractional coverage with the DGZ displaced,
Solution:
Step 1 RD/RI = .75
Step 2 CD90/RT = . 125
Step 3 Initial coverage = .57
Step 4 d/CD90 = 3.0
Step 5 Measure distance
Step 6 Final coverage = .48
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Before the mcdel is invoiced, a serious condition must
exist on the battlefield - one in -rfhich the commander with
responsibility and authority for employment of nuclear
weapons has decided to use them. This decision must be made
externally tc the mcdel. Once the decision is made, the
model will make all of the decisions necessary to solve the
target analysis problem, deliver the rounds and assess
damages to target elements.
E. I8P0T
As with any military operation, there are several
essential elements of information which must be available.
1. The location and size of friendly maneuver elements
lust be known.
2. Ihe location and type of nuclear capable artillery
batteries along with their nuclear load must be known.
3. The location size and type of enemy targets must be
estimated.
4. The commander's guidance for minimum acceptable damage
to enemy units must be announced.
C. STEPS OF THE SODEI
Step 1. For each target select feasible battery/yield
combicaticns.
A. Use the index method first.
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E. If the index method provides adequate covriaqe,
check for troop safety. If offset is not
necessary, file as a solution.
C. If offset is required, use numerical method. If
coverage is adequate, file as a solution.
D. Of all feasible solutions, select the one which
provides maximum coverage.
Step 2. For each -arget , employ the best round.
Step 3. Assess damage for each target.
A. Assess damage to each tank.
1. Determine the distance from GZ where a tank
has a 50% chance of damage due to
overpressure
.
2. Declare each tank as alive or dead as a
result of a Monte Carlo draw.
3. Assess damage for each troop.
1. Determine the distances from GZ where a troop
has a 50^ chance of survival due to thermal
radiation, overpressure and dynamic pressure.
2. For each troop in the targ^ perform a Monte
Carlo draw for each of the above damage
mechanisms. If any one fails, kill the
troop.
3. For each troop in the target which survives
to this point, determine nuclear radiation










Tc dc all of this the model uses various routines and
functions which are detailed in chapter V. The remainder of
this chapter will explain how the model proceeds, what
assumptions are made and, in a few cases, where seme
simplifyirg apprcxima-ions are made.
D. SELECT EEASIELE EATTEEY/YIELD COHBIHATIONS
The iiicdel loops through every target with every possible
battery/yield combination in an at-empi: to compile a listing
of adequate soluxions. The proceedure is tc;
1. Use the index method.
2. Determine if offset is necessary.
3. Use numerical method if offset is necessary
U. If coverage is adequate, file as a feasible solution.
"*
• l£^i2 Method
Tc start, the range to the target is computed. If
it is farther than the maximum range of the weapon system
currently being looped through, then it cannot be engaged by
that battery. The model will new loo? to the next battery.
Technically, a target which is out of range may
still be attacked successfully. In this situation an offset
distance equal to the difference between the actual range
and the maximum weapon range is used in a numerical method
analysis. The model does not allow for such an occurrance.
If the target is within range, the model loops
through each yield of the weapon system. Starting with the
smallest yield, the target radius is compared to the maximum
table tarcet radius. If it is too large, then the model
loops to the next higher yield. If it is not too large, it
performs an index method analysis.
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should the index method analysis provide a coverage
which is equal to or greater rhan the command guidance for
the target type, thsn a potential solution has been found.
If the coverage is inadequate, then the model loops to the
next higher yield.
It must be remembered *hat rhe target/battery/yield
sequence is a nested loop and it may not always be possible
to loop to the next higher yield. At a time when the
highest yield for a weapon is being looped over, looping to
the next higher yield actually means looping to the next
battery and starting again with the lowest yield. The same
applies to looping to the next battery when the model is at
the last battery.
Whenever a feasible solution is found with the index
method, the target is immediately checked for necessary
offset. Thus the loop in temporairly interrupted in order
to check for possible offset.
2 - C f f s €t t i nq De sired G round Zero
Recall that the index method required the desired GZ
to be the center of the target. Any offset necessitated by
troop safety considerations would require the use of the
numerical method which would analyze the target as a high
priority target and result in a degraded coverage. In the
case where initial coverage was adequate, further analysis
must be dene to see if offset is required and what effect on
feasatility it has.
Tc perform an offset is easily done on a map with a
compass, but is not as easily done with a digital computer.
Fig. 4.1 shows how it is done manually. The method io to
draw circles about each friendly maneuver unit center. The
radius of each circle is the unit radius plus the minimum
separation distance (MSD) to insure troop safety. The








Fizure 4.1 Manual Solution to Offset Problem
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chosen aim point is the point on the map which is clcs^'^r. to
the target center and still exterior to every circle. -
Simply stated, one just gets as close to the target
center as possible while staying far enough from each
friendly element to ensure safety. To do this envclves
solving a ncn-linear programming problem with a non-ccnvex
feasability region. The problem formulation is;
MIN (X-X^)^ + (Y-Y^)^
T T
St. (X-X.)^ + (Y-Y.)^ > (MSD + Unit Radius.)^11 1
i = 1, • • • , No. of Units
Rather than solve that problem, it is easier to
solve an iterative gecme-cric approximation. In many cases
the apprcxima ticn is exact. The approximation is as
follows,
1. Find the friendly unit whose perimeter is closest to
the target center. If it is within MSD of the target
center, move the desired ground zero directly away
from it an amount necessary -o satisfy safety.
2. Repeat the process until;
fi. No unit lies within USD or
E. 10 steps have been tried.
If a soluticr. canno"^ be found in 10 steps it is
probably because no feasible solution exists. Fig. U.2 is a
typical example. Cf the five units, three of them lie
within -MSD and the desired ground zero must be moved. Unit
4 is closest and the desired ground zero is moved directly
away from it. The new desired ground zero is acceptable.
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If unit 2 moves forward as shown in Fig. ^.3, tha
solution requires two iterations and is now an
approximation. The first iteration moves the desired ground
zero tc position 1. However, unit 2 is within MSC and
desired ground zero must be moved again. This time pcsirion
2 is selected. It is feasible and close to the optimum
location.
3 . Numerical Method
The numerical method was discussed in Chapter III,
Section C-2. This method was developed for use by a nuclear
target analyst in a field environment using tools commonly
available in a Divisional Fire Support Element. Such tools
are FM 101-31-3 [Ref. 2}, a compass, dividers and a pencil.
Thus, the transposition of the "measured distance" and
reading of a point on a graph seem like simple tasks and
natural things tc do manually. The method followed in the
computer code is a slight modifica-ion of the manual aethcd.
The scales in Fig. 3.7 are logrithmic. Therefore,
the addition of tfce "measured distance" is really a
multiplication operation such as;
CD90/RT -«-- CB90/RT * f (i/CD90)
where f(d/CE90) is the appropriate multiplier and is only a
function of d/CD90. It is much more reliable in the field
to allcw the target analyst to use dividers than to require
him tc correctly multiply.
In the example on page 39, the initial CD90/RT was
.125 and the displaced CD90/ST was .450. Obviously the
appropriate multiplier was 3.60.
Fig. 3.7 has been included here as Fig. 4.4 with
point number 7 added. If the value of the point number 7 is
lultiplied by 100, it will be 3,60. Thus, the appropriate









Figure 4.3 Offset as an Approximation.
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further modification. Several points on the d/CD90 scale
and the ccrresponding f(d/CD90) are in the dara base. For
any d/CE90 the correct f(d/CD90) can be found with one
interpolation.
The coverages from Fig. 3.7 are input into the data
base as a 2-diinensional table. Thus with RD/HT and CD90/RT
known, a double interpolation will produce the predicted
coverage.
4. Choosing the Best Battery/Yield Com bination
If, after all of this work, -he coverage is now
inadequate, the solution is abandoned and the program moves
en. Hcviever, if it is adequate, a soluricn containing the
target, battery, yield, desired GZ and predicted coverage
can be generated and filed away for later use. It would be
useful to file the feasible solution in such a way that
recovery cf the top one on the list is the best solution.
Table III shews hypothetical results of an analysis
requiring offset for the rounds of the MRC battery. Due to
safety imposed offset, the largest yield, while still
meeting command guidance, is clearly not the best chcice.
In fact, neither of the rounds from the MRC battery is the
best choice. The SRC battery with a 1 KT yield will provide
the highest coverage. Therefore, this program will file
solutions in descending order cf coverage. Should a tie
occur, the SRC takes precedence over the MRC for
conservation of force reasons.
1. EMPLCIING THE RODSD
When all of the targets have been analyzed for each
battery, the target analysis portion of the model is
finished. It is time to select the best battery/yield
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burst parameters are normally distributed. The actual
ground zero is picked from a bivariate normal distribution.
GZ = N (desired ground zero, CEP/1.1774)
Hieght cf burst and yield are selectad from univariate
normal distributions.
HOB = N(desired aOB, PEH/.67)
Yield = N(ncminal yield, nominal yield/10)
F. ASSESSING DAHAGE
For damage assessment it is assumed that HOBopt was
selected as though overpressure was the governing effect.
This is dene to avoid reading Figs. 2.1 and 2.2 into the
data base. This is dene for two reasons.
1. The data in the figures is very coarse and should not
fce accepted as highly accurate [ Hef . 1: preface ]-
2. A linear function results from the assumption.
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If the assumption that the weapon will function at HOBcpt
fcr overpressure is made, then one variable, the HOB, can be
omitted. If the employed weapon functions at HOBcpt than
the scaled HOB is siaply the HOBopt for a 1 KT weapon.
asing this HOB and the ranges found in Fig. 2. 1 for
desired cverpressuras and in Fig. 2.2 for desired dynamic
pressures, it is possible to plot yield against range with























Figure 4.5 Overpressure from Optiaum HOB.
If th€ weapon yield and the required overpressure or
dynamic pressure for a particular -argat defeat is known, it
is a simple matter fcr the computer to calculate the range



















Dynamic Pressure from Optiaum HOB.
Given: A detonation results in a 10 KT yield. An AFC is
damaged by 15 psi overpressure.
Find: The distance from ground zero at which the APC is
damaged.
Solution: From Fig. 4.5 locate 10 KT on the lower scale.
Go up to the 15 psi line. 2ead 790 meters from the left
scale.
In 'he model. Eg. 4,1 is used zo determine the range.
The coefficient A is a function of overpressure or dynamic
pressure and is determined from Figs. 4,5 and 4.6 when the
yield is 1 KT.
RD = A 'Yield 1/3 (4.1)
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The same simplificatiora can ba made concerning arrival
time. Equation 4.2 is the result.
T = {(.0028-R) - .45}-Yield^^~^ ('^•2)
It must be pointed out that this method will predict a
larger RD fcr overpressure than is correct when overpressure
is net the governing effect. However, overpressure is
almost always the governing effecr. (Radiation is usually
the governing effect only against personnel in the open.)
But, when radiation is the governing effect, enhancing the
effects of overpressure to their optimum will s-ill not
outweigh the effects of radiation. A soldier killed by
radiation will still be killed by radiation. The only error
is that a soldier who survives radiation and should have
survived overpressure will now have a decreased chance of
survival.
The alternative to the simplified method is to revert to
Eq. 2.1 with a table look-up and 2 way interpolation.
G. VSRiaBILITY OF EFFECTS
An object positioned at a certain range from a given
yield will be subjected to overpressure, dynamic pressure,
thermal radiation and nuclear radiation. In many cases one
damage mechanism will dominate the others. It would be a
simple matter to use only the dominant mechanism in
determining damage. In an expected value model this
technique is entirely justified but such a proceedure is not
followed in this model.
In a probabilistic model, such as this one it is
entirely possible for a target element to "beat the odds" on
overpressure and be killed by secondary missiles brought
about by dynamic pressure. If there was a 15% chance of
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damaqe by overpressure and only a ^Q% chance of damage by
dynamic pressure in a 50% threshold model, the element would
be killed by overpressure every time. In this model, each
mechanism gets a Monte Carlo chance to cause damage. In the
above example the subject has a 77,5% chance of damage.
More importantly, it has a non-zero chance of survival.
If the RD from Fig. 4.5 is found to be 700 meters (10
psi and 10 KT) then what are the probabilities for survival
at a closer range and for damage at a farther range? The
expected value medal would set these probabilities at zero.
This model will allow survival at a closer range and damage
at a farther range. To do this requires a probability
distribution.
T.rtiklltCT 1* I
. 1 t .» I..0 i.l l.i 1. J
DISTiMCZ TtOn CZ/tADlL'S OF MMCC
Figure U.7 Variability of Effects-
Fig. 4.7 [Ref. 4: p. D-3 ] is used in the FM 101-31
series and is followed in this model. The 20^ variance
curve is the one which is used. Plotted on normal plotting










.14 .6 .8 1 1.2 l.U 1.6
Distance from GZ/RD
Figure 4.8 Standard Deviation is 20% of R/HD.
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According to Fig. 4.7, a xarget alement at ground zsro
has some finite chance of survival while an element at an
infinite range may still perish. This is a logical result,
of the normal profcability assumption. To approximate
reality, any element with less than 0.5% chance of survival
is killed while anything with more than 99.5% chance of
survival always survives. Thus, only when R/RD is between
.5 and 1.5 is the Monte Carlo chance taken. An example will
demonstrate how the method works.
GIVES: A 6 KT burst. Tanks are damaged by 20 psi
overpressure.
FIND: Damage to tanks at 200 and 900 meters from GZ.
SOLUTION: From Fig- 4.5 the range at which a tank is
damaged is 500 meters. Correctly stated, this is RD, the
distance at which the tank has a 50% chance of survival The
first tank has a distance/BD of .40. From Fig. 4.8, the
probability of survival is less than 0-5% and the tank is
killed.
The second tank has a distance/RD of .555. A uniform
(0,1) draw is made for the tank and the number of .60 is
drawn. Since .5 55 is less than .60, the tank survives. Had
.554 cr less been drawn, the tank would have been killed.
H. TARGET RESPONSES
Target elements are of two types - tanks and perscnnel-
However, any target element which is damaged by blast,
thermal radiation or nuclear radiation may be easily input
into the model. Such elements would include APC's, trucks,
buildings, aircraft, forests, bridges, etc.
In this model the tanks are either fully functional or
killed. Personnel may have an additional state - dying.
This is caused by the absorption of nuclear radiation.
While the various mechanisms may kill a soldier upon burst.
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only the nuclear radiation will cause a laxsnt, lingering
death- Fig. 4.9 [Bef. 4: p. C-9] is used to classify
radiation casualties into the states of:
1. Dead.
2. Incapacitated and dying.
3. Impaired and dying.
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Figure 4.9 Personnel Besponses to fiadiation.
The model simplifies Fig. h.9 into Fig. 4.10 wi-h the
following
:
1. Anyone receiving 18,000 rads is declared dead
immediately.
2. Anyone receiving 3,000 to 18,000 rads is immediately
and permanantly incapacitated. He cannot shoot, move or
communicate but is still alive and should be considered
a pcrential target.
3. Anyone receiving 3,000 to 8,000 rads is immediately
incapacitated but in time is upgraded to functionally
impaired. The time is uniformly distributed from 30 to
60

US minutes. Eventually the person dies. Death occurs
in a uniformly distributed amount of time from 2 to 5
days.
4. Anyone receiving 2,000 to 3,000 rads is immediately
placed in the functionally impaired state where he
remains until death occurs in 2 to 5 days.
5. Anyone receiving a dose greater than his cwn personal
le-chal limit bet less than 2,000 rads is unaffected
until some latent period has passed at which time he
beccires functionally impaired. This time is uniformly
distributed from 30 to 60 minutes. Eventually, the
person dies in 2 to 5 days. The lethal limit is
ncrmally distributed about 650 rads with a standard
deviation of 50 rads.
6. Anyone receiving less than his own personal lethal
limit is unaffected.
I. OUTPDT
When the model is conpletely finished in will print all
of the pertinent information concerning each target and
employed round. Final output will be;
1. Burst parameters of GZ, HOB and yield for destruction
of each target.
2. Location and disposition of each element in each
target. For personnel not immedia-ely killed, -he





















Figure 4.10 Simplified Personnel Rsspcnses to Radiation.
J. SDMMABY
This model will, given several nuclear capable artillery
tatterics, friendly locations and snamy locations, select
optimum choices of tatteries and yields to fire at each
enemy target. It will, when necessary, allow for trcop
safity fcy offsetting the aim point of the weapon. It will
simulate delivery of each round and stochastically assess
damage to each individual element within the target. Tanks
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will fce declared either alive or dead while perscnnsl will




V, MODEL BO [JTINES
This chapter will explain the imporxant sections of the
actual model in detail. Actaal lines of the SIMSCRIPT model
(printed in capital letters) will be presented followed by
an explanation of what they do or mean. The complete modal
is included as Appendix B. Each routine and function is
discussed as a sspatate section in this chapter.
In reading about each routine and function it may be
helpful tc refer to Fig. 5.1 to ksep the flow of the model
in order.
A. FB£A!3£L£
The preamble extablishes global variables, identifies
permanent and temporary entities and their attributes,
groups entities into sets and identifies user defined
functions.
EERMANENI ENTITIES
EVEFY EATTEBY HAS A SIZE, AN X3, A Y5 AND SOME NUC. ROUNDS,
EVEEY CCMEANY HAS A XC , A YC, A ZC AND A CO.RADIUS
SVEBY TARGET HAS A TYPE, A XT, A YT, A ZT, A ET
AND MAY OWN A TANK. SET, A TROOP. SET, AND A LISTING
The EATTERY is an entity representing a nuclear capable
artillery battery. The SIZE is either short range cannon
(ISSmm, SIZE = 1) or medium range cannon (8 in., SIZE = 2).
XB and YE are grid coordinates. Nac. ROUNDS is the quantity
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Figure 5.1 Routine/Function Routing Chart.
The COMPANY is an entity representing a friendly unix.
It may be an individual soldier or vehicle or a collection
of such. Izs reason for existing is to cause offset
targeting due to friendly safety constraints, XC, YC, 2C
are the grid coordinates and altitude. CO. RADIUS is the
radius of the unit.
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Ihe TARGET is an entity which is to tae attacked. XI, YT
and ZT are grid coordinates and altitude. RT is the target
radius cr equivalent as explained in Chapter III. The
TARGET owns three sets. They are sets of TANKS, TROOPS and
a LISTING of feasible SOLUTIONS.
TEMPOEABY ENTITIES
EVERY TANK HAS A X.TANK, A Y.TANK, A TANK, DEAD,
AND MAY BELONG TO A TANK. SET
EVERY TflOCP HAS A X. TROOP, A Y. TROOP, A TRANS . FACTOR
,
fl TROOP. DEAD, A LETHAL. DOSE, AN ACCOM. DOSE,
A T.LETH, A I. IMPAIR. NOC
AND MAY BELONG TO A TROOP. SET
EVERY SOLUTION HAS A UNIT .TO . FIRE, AN XDGZ, A YDGZ,
AN lYIELD, A OROW, A KCCL AND A PCT
AND BELONGS TO A LISTING
The TANK has coordinates X.TANK and Y.TANK. The
altitude is assumed equal to that of the target to which it
will te assigned. TANK. DEAD is an integer number, sither
or 3 . A means the tank is fully functional. A 3 means it
has suffered a catastrophic kill.
The TROOP has ccordinates X. TROOP and Y. TROOP. The
altitude is assumed equal to that of the target to which it
will be assigned. The TRANS. FACTOR is the radiation
transmission factor and is currently either a 1 for exposed,
.3 for protection inside an APC and .001 for a fox hole.
TROOP. DEAE is similar to TANK. DEAD except for two additional
values. A 1 is functionally impaired and a 2 is
incapacitated. LETHAL. DOSE is that radiation dose above
which the TROOP will eventually die. ACCUM.DOSE is the
radiation dose the TFCOP has currently accumulated. T.LETH
is the time when TROOP. DEAD is to be set equal to 3.
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T.IMPAIB.NUC is the time when TROOP. DEAD is to be set equal
to 1.
A SCIUTION is an answer to the nuclear target analysis
problem. Its attributes are the firing unit, desired ground
zero, expected coverage and indicies to locate the table,
row and cclumn where the solution was found. It is filed in
a LISTING belonging to a TARGET. The LISTING is ranked
first by high coverage and then by low yield.
GLOBAL VARIABLES
There are two sets of equivalent arrays. One pertains
to the SRC and the ether to the SRC . The SRC has 9 rows
while the MRC has 19 rows. In the following, only the SRC
is explained but the description extends equally to the MRC.
SRC. E. COVERAGE is the 4 dimensional matrix which
contains the coverage probabilities. The first subscript is
the yield. The second is the type of target. The third and
fourth are the row and column of the table described by
yield and type. The current model allows seven types of
targets. They are;
1. Exposed personnel. Immediate permanent casualties.
2. Exposed personnel. Immediate transient casualties.
3. Personnel in fox holes. Immediate permanent casualties,
4. Personnel in fox holes. Immediate transient casualties.
5. Moderate damage to Tanks.
6. Moderate damage to Wheeled Vehicles.
7. Moderate damage to Artillery.
SRC. RANGES is the array of ranges that the system is
capable cf. (See Fig. 3,5)
SEC.TABLE. RT is the 3-dimensional matrix which contains
the RT for the various tables. The first subscript is the
yield. The second is the type of target. The third is the
column of the table, (See Fig 3.5)
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SBC. YIELDS is th€ array of possible yields. Each w<=afon
has two yields available. The SRC has a . 2 KT and a 1KT
while the MEC has a 2 KT and an 8 KT.
MSD.SEC is a 2-dimensional matrix which contains values
of minimuiD safe distances. The first subscript is the row
of the table and the second is the yield. MSD is only a
function cf weapon size, range and yield but not target type
or degree of damage.
CD90.SRC, CEP. SBC and PEH.SRC are arrays with only the
range as a variable. They are a function cf the delivery
system only. The subscript is the row of any table for the
applicable weapon system.
HOB. SEC is a 3-dimensional matrix which has th<= desired
height of burst. The first subscript is the yield. The
second subscript is the row of the table. The third
subscript is the type of target.
SEC.aiN.RD and SBC. EXP. RD are the minimum radius of
damage and the expected radius of damage. Their
dimensionality and subscript m.eaning are the same as
HOB. SBC.
CDSO.RT, RD.RTr D. CD9 and DIS FLAC2D. COVES AGE are the
parameters used with Fig. 3.7 to solve an offset coverage
problem. CD90.RT is CD90/RT. RD. RT is RD/RT. D.CD90 is
d/CD90. DISPLACED COVERAGE is a matrix of coverage values
used for table look-up once the entry arguments have been
deteririned.
B. MAIN
The MAIN serves as a vehicle to define and read local
variables and call subroutines and functions which do the
bulk cf the work.
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PCLICY is an array which represents the coaunander* s
guidance en each of the types of targets. Its Isngth is
NTABLES - one for each of the seven types of targets. If
the predicted coverage on a targex does not equal or exceed
the PCLICY for that type of target, then the solution is
abandoned.
RANGE is the range from the battery to the target for
which a solution is teing sought.
The remainder cf MAIN is involved with calling
subroutines to solve the problem. MAIN first calls
EEAD.EESEEVE which reserves and reads all of the global
variables. MAIN then calls INITIALIZE. It then loops
through every TARGET and every BATTERY in an attempt to find
adequate SOLOTIONS. To do this i- calls ANALYSIS which, in
turn, calls other subprograms. After returning from
ANALYSIS, the MAIN is ready to employ the weapons. It
removes xhe first SOIDTION from zhe LISTING of each TARGET
and calls DETONATION which assesses damage. Upon returning
from DETCNATION, the MAIN lisTS the attributes of the
permanent entities and terminates.
C. SOEECOTINE HEAD.BESERV2
This subroutine reserves and reads the global variables
as defined in the PREAMBLE
D. SOBBCCTINE INITIAIIZE
This is a surrogate for a driver program. As stated in
the abstract, i:his program is intended as a subroutine for a
larger sinularion - one which already has entities such as
TARGET, TANK and TROOP. Since these entities do not exist,
INITIALIZE creates them. A detailed description of rhe
subroutine will not te offered here since it is unimportant:
and easy to read. It will suffice zo say that it unifcrily
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distributes TANK and TROOP entitiss within the RT of th^
TARGET while assigning attributes to the temporary enti-ies.
E. SOBRCOTINE ANALYSIS
This subroutine is the origin of SOLUTION. It is here
that a decision is niade to create a SOLUTION and then to
file it in a LISTING or discard it. The first action is to
determine the size cf the BATTERY which has been passed to
it. It then determines if the TARGET is wirhin range. If
not, it returns to MAIN without a SOLUTION. If the range is
less than the maximuni weapon range, then it finds the proper
row (J) to use as an entry argument. It then loops over all
yields to determine coverage for each yield. For each yield
it determines the proper column (K) to use as the other
entry argument. If it cannot find any (RT too big) it loops
to the next yield cr returns to MAIN if it was at the
largest yield.
If a row and cclumn were found, then a SOLUTION is
created and the index method is used to compute the initial
coverage. If the BT is less than or equal to the first
listed in the tatle, then the coverage in the first cclumn
is repcrtsd. If not, the function EXP. COVERAGE is called.
This returns the expected initial coverage using the index
method.
A decision is made concerning the coverage and the
command guidance (POLICY) for that type of target. If the
coverage is adequate, then OFFSET. COVERAGE is called. This
will return with a new coverage which is less than cr equal
to rh€ cne returned by EXP .COVERAGE. If this new coverage
is still adequate, the attributes of SOLUTION are determined
and it is filed in the LISTING cf zhe TARGET for which it
was called. Control is then returned to MAIN.
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F. SOBBOOTINE EXP. COVERAGE
This function was originally established to perform the
interpolation wixh the index method. However, as it became
necessary to perform interpolaxion in orher subprograms, a
dedicated interpolation function (INTERP) was written.
Currently this function simply determines the size of the
EATTEEli and properly formats the arguments for a call to
INTERP. It then returns with the expected coverage to
ANALYSIS.
G. SOBBODTINE OFFSEl .COVER AGE
This subroutine is called when the initial analysis is
at least adequate. It determines if any offset is necessary
and, if so, performs an analysis using the numerical method.
The first order of business is to call MAX. DISTANCE
which actually locates the new desired ground zero. If
there is no displacement, then there is no change in
coverage and control is returned to ANALYSIS. MAX. DISTANCE
will also return a flag which may mean no feasible solution
exists and coverage is set equal to zero. This will cause
the scluticn not to be filed in a LISTING.
Next, the battery size is determined and the entry
arguments of Fig. 3.7 are calculated. Depending on the
value of d/CD90 (Y2) one of three things can happen;
1. Consider the target as a point target.
2. Analyze as instructed.
3. Degradation is insignificant. Return.
Currently, a point target analytical technique is not
included, but the technique is slightly easier than this
one. The only time an area target would be analyzed as a
point target is if the RD is at least 10 times greater than
RT, This cnly happens with large yields. Case 2 is the
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only ons for which further analysis is required (assuming
case 1 dees not happen).
Cas3 2. d/CD90 is located on the ordinate and (with a
call tc INTER?) the measured distance is found. As
explained in Chapter III, the measured distance (DELX) is
multiplied by the original CD90/RT and used to find the
predicted coverage due to offset. A double interpolation is
necessary to find the coverage. Control is then returned to
ANALYSIS. If the ccverage is still adequate, the SOLUTION
is filed in a LISTING.
H. FOMCTION INTER?
This is an elementary interpolation function, is self
explanatory and is net further explained here.
I. SOBBCDTINE MAX. DISTANCE
This subroutine performs the approximation to the
non-linear programming problem as s-ated in Chapter III.
The Icgic fellows the graphical solurions as shown in Figs.
4.1 and 4.2
J. SOBECOTINE DETONATION
The purpose of this subroutine is to Sissess damage now
that the analysis is complete. The best SOLUTION for a
TARGET has been removed from its LISTING and passed to -his
subroutine.
Again, a decision is made regarding the BATTERY size.
The standard daviaticn for ground zero location is found Eg
3.1. The PEH and desired HOB are selected from the tables.
To determine ground zero the radial miss distance, R, is
computed as N(0 , CEP/1. 1774) while an angle. A, is picked




The actual yield is selected from a normal distribut:LCR
with ncminal yield as the mean. (Actual variances are
classified) The standard deviation is assumed to b9 ens
tenth cf the mean.
HOB is selected from a normal distribution with DHCB as
the mean and PEH/.67 as the standard deviation.
The actual GZ, yield and HOB have now been fixed and the
burst parameters are output by the sratement;
LIST X, 1, YISLD, HOE
EACH TANK in TANK . SET (TARGET) and TROOP in
TROOP. SET (TARGET) is examined -co check for damage. As
stated, the TANK can only be fully operatinal (TANK. DEAD =
0) or killed (TANK. DEAD =3). The only mechanism which has
any reasonable chance to destroy a tank is overpressure.
The overpressure at which a TANK has a 50^ chance of
survival is 25 psi. Thus;
LET RD. OVER. PRESSURE = OVER . PRESSURE (YIELD, 25)
will re-urn the dis-riance from GZ where 25 psi will be
encountered and will be used to determine if the TANK is
destroyed.
IF (R/RE.CVEB. PRESSURE LE .5) OR
(.01* (NSCTRCN(R, YIELD) PLUS GAMMA (R, Y lELD) ) GT 18000)
is a compound IF statement which destroys the TANK
(TANK. DEAD = 3) if either of the following conditions are
met.
1. If the probability of destruction by overpressure is
greater than 99.5% or




The IROOP is put through all four damage mechanisms
before being declared a survivor. The thermal level at
which a TROOP has a 50% chance cf survival is 20 caX/cci .
Thus ;
LET RD.HEAT = HE AT ( yield ,20)
will return the distance from GZ where 20 cal/cm will be
encountered and will be used to determine if the TROOP is
killed. Tc become a thermal casualxy a compound IF
statement must ba true:
The TROOP must be exposed (TRANS. FACTOR (TROOP) = 1) and
The TRCCF must receive enough thermal energy to become a
therial casualty (PROB ABILITY(R/RD .HEAT) LT CHANCE) and
His reaction time must be greater than . 1 second.
If the TROOP survives the first tesr, he may beccme a
casualty due to overpressure. The overpressure at which a
TROOP has a 50% chance of survival is 10 psi. Thus;
LET RD. OVER. PRESSURE = 07ER . PRESSURE (YIELD , 1 0)
will return the distance from GZ where 10 psi will be
encountered
and will be used to determine if t-he TROOP is destroyed.
If R/RD is less than .5, the TROOP is killed (TROOP. DEAD =
3). Otherwise he must take a Monte Carlo chance;
IF PRCBAcILITY (R/RD. OVER. P RESSURE) LT CHANCE
If the above statement is true then the TROOP is killed.
If the TROOP is still alive, he must now survivs the
effects cf dynamic pressure. This section is identical tc
overpressure with the exception of a call to




After all of zhis, if the TROOP is still alive, nuclear
radiaticu gets its chance. The combined effects of nauzron
and gamma gamma radiation are added to the current radiation
level.
ADD TRANS. FACTOR(TRCOP) *(( NSDTRON (R, YIELD) +GAMMA (R, YIELD)) )
TO ACCOM. DOSE(TROOP)
If the IROCP has accumulated more than 18,000 rads he is
killed (TBCCP. DEilD = 3).
If the ACCUM.DOSE is between 8,000 and 18,000 rads he is
placed in the incapacitated state (TROOP. DEAD(TROOP) = 2)
until he is killed in 2 to 5 days.
LET T.LETH (TROOP) =R AUDI .F ( 2*24*60, 5*24*60 , 1)
If the ACCUM.DOSE is between 3,000 and 8,000 rads he is
placed in the incapacitated state for 30 to u5 minu-es.
LET T.IMPAIP.NUC (TROOP) = R ANDI. F (30 , 45, 1)
A- the end of this time he is placed in the functionally
impaired state (TROOP. DEAD (TROOP) = 1) . He is killed in 2
to 5 days.
If the ACCUM.DOSE is between 2,000 and 3,000 rads he is
placed in the functicnally impaired state until he is killed
in 2 to 5 days.
If the ACCUM.DOSE is greater than what he can tolerate
(LETHAL. DCSE (TROOP) ) but less than 2,000 rads the TROOP is
unaffected for a short period of time - 30 zo 60 minutes.
LET T. IMPAIR. xMUC (TROCP) = R ANDI. F (30 , 60 , 1)
At the end of this time he is placed in -che functionally
impaired state. He is killed in 2 to 5 days.
If ACCUM.DOSE is less than LETHAL .DOSE (TROOP) then he is




K. FONCIION 0?EB. PRESSUBE
This function determines the distance from GZ at which a
target element will encounter a 50% chance of survival for
the achieved yield and required oper pressure.
L. FONCIIOH DYNAMIC. fRESSORE
This function determines the distance from GZ at which a
target element will encounter a 50% chance of survival for
the achieved yield and required dynamic pressure.
H. FONCTICN ARRIVAL. TIME
This function executes rhe arrival time function and
returns the time after de-conation when the blast wave will
pass the given distance fromn GZ.
H. FONCTION GAMMA
Equation 2.4 is executed by this function. For the
achieved yield and distance from GZ -he amount of neutron
radiation is returned.
0- FONCTION NEOTSON
Equation 2.3 is executed by this function. For the
achieved yield and distance from GZ the amount of neutron
radiation is returned.
P. FONCTION HEAT
Equation 2.2 is executed by this funcrion. For the
achieved yield and thermal requirement the distance from GZ




This function afproxi mates rhs area under a N(0,1)
probatility curve. It is a table lock-up for Fig. 4.8.
Only entry arguments (E/RD) of .5 and greater are passed to




71. ENHANCEMENTS AND EXTENSIONS
A. OPTIMDM ASSIGNMENT OF BATTERIES.
This model assigrs batteries to fire on an essentially
random basis. There is no thought given to optimizing the
coverage. Choosing the highest coverage for each target on
a first in first out basis may not provide maximum total
coverage. An assigr.ment problem must be solved to do this
correctly.
Table IV is a potential nuclear load for three batteries
in the fcllcwing example.
TABLE IV
Haclear Load by Batt'2ry
















Table V shows the coverages zh.a.z can be obtained with
the various battery/yiel i combinarions on five -argets. A
zero means that the target is ei-her out of range or
coverage is less than command guidance. Note that battery 1
has 2 rcunds of 1 KT yield and, thus, has 2 identical rows
for the 1 KT rounds. A similar situation is true for the 8











Battery Yield 1 2 3 4 5
.2 KT .72 .00 .00 .00 .00
1 1 KT .82 .80 .00 .45 .00
1 KT .82 .80 .00 .45 .00
.2 KT .75 .00 .42 .00 ,00
2 1 KT .65 .00 .51 .42 .00
2 KT .92 .63 .47 . 97 .92
•4 3 KT .97 .00 .00 .00 .00




Tc assign battery/yield combinations to a target






This aiangement results in a total coverage of 3.25, but
target number 5 cannot be engaged because the only feasible
round for it was employed on target number 4. The
assignment problem that needs to be solved is one that will









The cptimum assignment is;
Target Ea-ctery/Yield Coverage
1 3/8 Kt .97
2 1/1 Kt .80
3 2/1 Kt .51
4 1/1 Kt .45
5 3/2 Kt .92
The optimum total coverage is then 3.65.
In the current mcdel, only the percentage of coverage is
used to elvaluata the value of the target. This may net be
the item to maximize if the various targets are not of the
same typ? and population. For example, a 97% coverage en an
infantry company is not as valuable as a 50% coverage on a
tank regiment. Tc make the matrix in Table V mere
realistic, a variable such as;
Value = coverage * element value * target population
should b€ used.
B. VABIATICN OF MSD
Typically, an operations order specifies the trcop
safety guidance as a negligible risk to unwarned exposed
personn3l. This is the category used in the model tc
determine MSD. Fig. 6.1 shows the different separation
distances that must fce achievsd for the safety categories
of;
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Figure 6.1 Minimum Separation Distances.
In Fig. 6.1 the MSD for a negligible risJc to unwarned
exposed and warned exposed personnel are 7700 and 4600
meters respecriveiy. Recall tha-c MSD is the reason for
offset and offset is the reason for some very severer
degradation in coverage. If the 4600 meter MSD could be
used, then the displacement could be reduced by 430C meters-
This could maJce a significant difference in the final
outcome of the simulation.
Expansion of the MSD category would greatly expand the
use of the model as an analytical tool.
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C. CCLLfiTERAL DAHAGl AVOIDANCE.
Chapter 14 of Ref. 2 contains least s9parat:ion
distances (LSD) to avoid damage to many entities such as
buildings, forests, bridges and civilian populations. This
imposes the same type of offset requirement on the aimpoint
as MSD dees except that it precludes damage to entities
ether than friendly troops.
Use of this idea would require implementation cf a
routine similar to that which determines offset except that
the description of what is being avoided must also be
included.
D. MDITIELE TARGETS
As it has already been shown, the center of a target
need not be the aimpoint. It would be highly advantageous
to destroy more than one target with a single burst. Fig.






Figure 6.2 Multiple Targets,
displacement distance to insure minimum acceptable coverage.
The "triangular" area that is inside all circles is a
feasible area for each target. That is, a round employed
anywhere in the "triangle" will destroy all 3 targets.
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A method to evaluate groups of targets would greatly
expand th€ use of the model as an analytical tool.
E. FALLCQT
Generally, nuclear weapons are detonated at or above an
altitude that provides a 99% assurance of no fallout {Eqs,
3.4 and 3.5). However, fallout may be an effective barrier
to movement or cause mass evacuation of a contaminated area.
Control of fallout after employment is impossible due to
atmospheric conditions and the user may become the victim.
Should a ground burst occur, it is necessary to predict
and simulate fallout. Predicting fallout requires that
meterclogical data at altitudes up to and including cloud
top must be known. A deterministic model for predicting
fallout is relatively simple but actually simulating fallout
may require assistance from experts in metecrolcqy.
P. ACTICNS TAKEN DOBING AND AFTER FALLOOT.
While the detonation of nuclear weapons will certainly
cause seme unique actions and reactions, there are seme
specific actions required of soldiers upon encountering
fallout.
1- Cptimum Time of Exit.
For personnel caught in a fallout area (presumably
in covered fox holes cr shelters) there is an optimum time
to exit the area to minimize the absorption of nuclear
radiation.
While soldiers stay in the protective confines of
their fox holes, they take advantage of the shielding. They
also prolong their exposure time. To immediately leave
would reducs their exposure time but would expose them to a
much higher dose rate outside their shelters.
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For given initial dose rats, decay rate, shielding
and exposure time to a safe area, there is an optimum time
to leave.
2- Crossing Prob lem .
Given that a unit must cross a radiation area, there
is a nou-earlier-than time fcefora which rhey may not enter.
It is a function of SES , fallout pattern and decay rata,
speed of crossing and shielding during the crossing.
Inclusion of this type of problem into the the maneuver
section of a driver routine would certainly have an impact
upon the outcome of the simulation.
3- Decont am inat ion.
Actions taken to decontaminate vehicles and
personnel are relatively simple if only transportation to
and from a decontamination site and time taken to
decontaminate are considered. The main problem with
decontamination is one of supply.
G. ADDIIICNAL TARGET ELEHSBTS.
The current model has only tanks and troops in the
target areas. Any target may be added to the target array
by defining it as a temporary entity and allowing a target
to own it. To damage the entity requires the modeler to
call one or more of the damage functions with the
appropriate arguments and then decide if the entity is







Sinc€ the model needs the gamma radiation level at a
specific range for a given yield, i^ is advantagous to
replct Fig. 2.7 with dose as the dependent: variable. Fig.












package fcr the equation;
the A?L linear regression
In (Dose) = A -^ 3 * Range + C * In (Yield)
fails tc provide an adequate solution. Therefore, the model
was solved in piecss and reassembled.
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The procedure was to regress each line independently as
In (Dose) = A + B * Range
for each yield. The coefficients A and B are obtained for
each yield and are listed in Table VI.
TABLE VI
Coefficients A and B.
Yield A B
1 11 .18 -.0060
2 11 .56 -.0056
3 11 .76 -.0054







For each yield, the coefficients are plotted as shown in
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Figure A. 3 Begression Coefficient B (Data)
The coefficients can now be regressed against yield. From
Fig. A. 2 the first coefficient appears to vary as the square
root cf yield. Therefore, the equation;
A = Co Ci '/Yield





This equation is plotted in Fig. A. 4 along with the
original coefficient data. The fit. is qu-te good.
Regression Coefficient A (fiegressed)
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There is a temptation to say that the coefficient, E, is
really a constant since the carve is very flat and xhe
represented values are so small. However, it must be
rememtered thaz this is to be multiplied by the range and
the result used as an exponent. Any small error may have
catastrophic results. From Fig- A. 3 a straight line of the
form;
E = Cq + Ci * Yield











U 5 6 7 3 9 10
Regression Coefficient B (Regressed)
Assembling the equation results in the following
equation.
G = 45156




Equation A.I is plotted on Fig
along with the original data.
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1000 1200 1400 1500 1300
Full Gamma Begression Model.
It is important that the equation be accurate in the
vicinity of 650 rads as this is the aaan of the lethal dose
distribution and is the d:.viding point betwean surviving and
dying.
E. NEOTBCN BADIATI08
Lika gamma radiation, the model needs the neutron
radiation level at a specific range for a given yield.
However, Fig. 2.6 appears to have stra:.ght lines which can
te exploited in a regression analysis. Fig. 2.6 has been
converted to a metric scale and is presented in Fig. A. 7.
The neutron regression model was also split into two
submodels. Each line was regressed independently as;
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Figure A. 7 Heutron Radiation,
The ccef f icien-cs A and B are obtained for each dose and are













Fcr each doss, the coe f ficien-cs are plotted as shewn in




Figure A. 8 Regression Coefficient A (Data).
1 G C
with
For the first coef ficienr. A, -he lodal is
In (A) = Co + Ci * In (Dose)
C = 7 . 77
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Dose
Regression Coefficient B (Data)
.
with
For the secor.d ccefficient, B, ths moiel is
E = Cg • Ci * In (Dose)
Co = 190.45
Cj = -6.4145
The submodels can now be assembled and result in th^
following full mcdel.
Range = '^^^^'V^ ^,, + (190-o . u . £n(Dose ) ^ • ^n(Yield)
Dose 1696
(A. 2)
What the model needs is a func-ion of range and yield
which yields dose. Equation A. 2 cannnot be separated to do
this, Therefore an approximation is offered. The term;
190 - 6 .4 * In (Dose)
is the slope of the line for a given dose. For doses from
30 -o 10,000 rads, the average slope is 150. The proposal
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is to us€ 150 as the slope for every line. Fig. A. 3 has the
data plotted again as well as Eg. A. 2 and the new proposal.















Yield (KT) Simplified O
Figure A. 10 Heutron Radiation and Regression,
Table VIII lists the full model slope and the percent
error if a slope of 150 is used. Notice that the error is
negative at low doses but is getting larger. Thus, it is



























is 518 rads. As with gamma radiation, it is impomant that
the model te accurate at radiation lavels of 650 rads and
below. Obviously, this is.
Above 518 rads, the error is positive and continues to
increase. At 10,000 rads the arror is about the same as at
30 rads. This seems to be a warning about extrapclaticn.
It would b€ unwise to use this formula for ranges and
radiation levels outside those from which it was derived.
Using the approximation, Eq. A. 2 becomes
Range = 2353 .47
Dose
.1596 + 150- en(.Yield)
which can new be separated.








The medal iisss a thermal radiarion equation which yialds
range as a function of yield and radiant exposure. Fig. 2.2
is already in that format with the exception that range is
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Figure A. 1 1 Thernal Radiation.
The previously used method of using submodels will again
be used. The full model is;
Range = A + B * In (Yield)
for each exposure. The coefficients A and 3 are obtained
for each exposure and are listed in taale IX .
For each exposure, the coefficients are plotted as shown
in Figs. A. 1 2 and A, 13. The coefficients can now be
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Figure A. 12 Begression Coefficient A (Data)
Fcr the first coefficient. A, the model is
A = Cq + C^ * ln(3x?03ure)
Cg = 7.3528
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Regression Coefficient B (Data)
The second coefficient could now be regressed against
exposure, but several models tried failed to yield an
accurate explanation of behavior of the coefficient as a
function of exposure. This makes sense since 3 is -he slope
of a given line and all lines appear to be parallel.
Therefore, an average slope value is used.
B = .5051
The submodels can now be assembled and result in the
following full model.




Ncrmally, a fig\:re would be used to compare the data to
the regression lines at this point. However, the agreement
is so good that a graph would lack enough detail to reveal
any differences. Therefore, Tables X and XI will be offered





















































Exposure 1 2 3 5 7 10
^ 912 1295 1590 2058 2439 2920
5 711 1009 1239 1603 1900 2275
8 565 802 985 1274 1510 1809
12 464 658 308 1045 1239 1484
25 324 460 564 730 366 1037
5C 230 3 28 402 521 617 739
I
As cr.€ can clearly see, the fit is excellent., but -he
same caution about extrapolation aust apply. Equation A.
4





This appendix contains a copy of the listing file for a
test run of the mcdel. There are three targets, five
batteries and three companies. Each target has 50 tanks and
50 troops uniformly distributed within the RT. Table XII
lists the target data while Ta.bls XIII lists the battery
data and Table XIV lists the company data. Target types are
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Alpha particle: A radioactive emmision identical with the
helium nucleus, having a mass of four and an electric charge
of two pcsixive units.
Attenuation: A decrease in intensity due to absorption or
scattering, but not due to geometric reduction as a result
of range.
Beta particle: A radioactive emmision identicle in
composition to an electron with the possible exception that
beta particles possess a very high speed.
Induced Hadioactivity: Radioactivity produced in certain
elements by the capture of free neutrons. In the area
immediately below Ground Zero the elements of sodium,
manganese, aluminum and silicon are are easily induced,
Neutron: A particle of mass one and without any el-actric
charge. Neutrons are present in all elements except light
hydrogen and are required to initiate the detonation process
in nuclear weapons.
Bad: Cne of many measures of radiation density or
destructive power. It represents the absorption of 100 ergs
of ionizing radiation per gram of absorbing material, such
as body tissue,
B. TARGET ANALYSIS
Functionally impaired: Personnel who exhibit some decreased
ability to perform their assigned tasic, but are not
incapacitated. Char icteriz ed by vomiting, diarrhea, nausea,
lethargy, depression and mental disorientation.
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laaediate peraanent incapacitation (IP) Immediate permanent
incapacitation is the ;most severe of the radiation criteria
and causes death in the shortest amount of time. Pers'onnel
performing tasks which are physically demanding become
incapacitated within 5 minutes of exposure. They remain in
this state for 1 to 2 days at whick nime death occurs.
Immediate transient incapacitation (IT) Personnel receining
this dose become incapacitated within 5 minutes of exposure
and remain so for 30 to 45 minutes. Personnel then recover,
but are functionally impaired until death which occurs in 4
to 6 days.
Latent lethality (LL) Personnel exposed to this their lethal
dose become functionally impaired within 2 hours of
exposure. More than half of this group will die within
several weeks.
Incapacitated: An ir.dividual who performs at 50 f or less
of his pre-iznradiat ion performance level.
Radiation exposure status: A unit wide rating relating the
average accumulated dose to the risk warranted exposure of
pending missions.
ainimum separation distance (BSD): The distance friendly
troops must be from the burst to insure less than 2% chance
of damage.
Light damage: Light damage does not prevent the immediate
use of an item. Seme repair by the user will usually be
needed to make the item operational.
Moderate damage: Moderate damage prevents use of an item
until extensive repairs are made. This degree of damage is
normally sufficient to deny use of the equipment. In most
situations, achievement of this degree of damage will be
sufficient to support tactical operations.
Severe damage: Severe damage prevents use of an item
permanently. There may be some situations such as the
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